The paper examines the definitions of open default theories known from the literature. First it is shown that none of them is satisfactory either for formal or for intuitive reasons. Next a new approach is considered.
Introduction
One of the widely used nonmonotonic formalisms is Reiter's default logic [HI. This logic deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the form 6(x) = a(x) : MP, (4, . . . , W, (4 Y(X) 7 where a(x), PI(x), . . . , P,(x), Y(X), m 3 1, are formulas of the first-order predicate calculus whose free variables are among x =x1, . . . ,x,. A default is closed if none of (Y, PI, . . . , &, y contains a free variable. Otherwise a default is called open. The formula cy(x) is called the prerequisite of the default rule, the formulas PI(x) , . . . , p,(x) are called the justijications, and the formula y(x) is called the conclusion. Roughly speaking, the intuitive meaning of an open default is as follows. For every n-tuple of objects t = t,, . . . , t,,, if a(t) is believed, and the pi(t)% are consistent, then one is permitted to deduce -y(t). Thus an open default can be thought of as a kind of a "default scheme", where the free variables x can I Artijicial Intelligence 77 (1995) X5-319 be replaced by any of the theory's objects. Various examples of deduction by default rules can be found in [15] .
Whereas closed defaults have been quite thoroughly investigated, very little is known about open ones. Moreover, there is no common attitude towards their meaning. However, interesting cases of default reasoning usually deal with open defaults, because the intended use of a default is to determine whether an object possesses a given property rather than accepting or rejecting a "fixed statement".
Three major approaches to the treatment of open defaults are known from the literature. The first one belongs to Reiter [El, where he gives explicit names to the theory objects by extending the theory language with new constants. Then Reiter treats an open default as a set of all its closed instances in the enriched language. The second approach is similar to the first one and belongs to Poole [14] who replaces an open default by the set of all its closed instances over the original language. The last approach is that of Lifschitz [9] , where free variables in defaults are treated as object variables, rather than metavariables for the closed terms of the theory.
In this paper we examine the above approaches from formal and intuitive points of view. Obviously, the most natural formal test for accepting a definition of an extension for an open default theory is that it must be equivalent to the original definition of Reiter, when applied to a closed default theory. However, this necessary condition is not sufficient, because equivalent definitions of extensions for closed default theories become different when one extends them to open default theories. Since there are no (and cannot be any) formal criteria for a sufficient condition, in order to choose the right definition we should rely on our imprecise intuition to tell us what we should expect from an extension for an open default theory.
As the result of our analysis we argue that all Reiter's, Poole's and Lifschitz's definitions are not entirely sound. In particular, Reiter's definition that gives explicit names to implicitly defined objects is counterintuitive and also is not acceptable from a formal point of view, Poole's definition that deals only with explicitly defined objects is too weak (yet it passes the formal test), and Lifschitz's definition that treats explicitly defined objects as implicitly defined ones is not acceptable either for a formal or for an intuitive reason. However, Lifschitz's definition seems to be more promising, and we propose a modification to Lifschitz's definition which makes it free from its obvious deficiencies. The main feature of the modified definition is that it clearly separates between explicitly and implicitly defined theory objects. It also passes the formal test and its connection to circumscription is similar to the original one.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the definition of extensions for closed default theories, in Sections 3 and 4 we examine, respectively, Poole's and Reiter's definitions of extensions for open default theories, and in Section 5 we consider a possible modification to Reiter's definition. Section 6 contains a semantical definition of extensions for closed default theories, which is the starting point for Lifschitz's and our approaches. In Section 7 we examine Lifschitz's approach to open default theories, in Section 8 we present a modi-fication to this approach which is more robust than the original, and in Section 9 we show how extensions for default logic with fixed constants can be expressed in terms of the modified approach. In Section 10 we establish a relationship between the modified Lifschitz's approach and circumscription. Finally, we end the paper with some concluding remarks.
Closed default theories
In this section we recall Reiter's definition of extensions for closed default theories. This definition is frequently used in this paper as a formal criterion for accepting or rejecting definitions of extensions for open default theories. In particular, as was mentioned in the introduction, if we accept Reiter's definition of extensions for closed default theories as a "right one", then a "right" definition of extensions for open default theories, when applied to a closed default theory, must be equivalent to Reiter's definition.
For the "only if" part, let E be an extension for (D, A), and let A, = E fl {p: +@ ED}.
Th en, by [15, Theorem 2. 51, E = Th(A U A,). It remains to show that Th(A U A by) (=E) is a maximal consistent set of sentences of the form Th(A U A'), where A' C {p: 9 E D}. Assume to the contrary that this is not the case. and let Th(A U A'), where A' C {j?: 9 E D}, be a maximal consistent set of sentences containing E as a proper subset. By the "if" part of the lemma, Th(A U A') is an extension for (D, A), in contradiction with the Minim&y of Extensions [15, Theorem 2.41. 0
Poole's definition of open default theories
In this section we analyze Poole's definition of open default theories. Even though, this definition was introduced eight years later than Reiter's one, it is discussed first for a methodological reason. For both Poole's and Reiter's approaches we need the following definition. Note that if all defaults from D are closed, then D = D. Therefore Poole's definition when applied to closed default theories is equivalent to Reiter's original definition. However Example 5 below' shows that Poole's approach which deals only with explicitly defined theory individuals, is too weak. Intuitively, one would expect of an implicitly defined individual satisfying Q that it satisfy P in the extension for this theory. That is, one would expect of 3x(P(x) A Q(x)) to belong to the extension. However, since b = 0, (D, A) has a unique Poole extension E = A.
Reiter's definition of open default theories
In [15] Reiter suggests an interpretation of an open default as the collection of all closed defaults of the form 6(t) = EC') ' MP1(ly);l;. . MP& , where t = t, , . . . , t, is a 'The example is similar to that of Reiter [IS. pp. IIS-1161, see Example 6 in the next section tuple of the theory individuals. However, this interpretation depends on an explicit representation of the objects under consideration, or, in other words, it depends on the underlying language. As has been pointed out in [15] (D, A) , where D consists of only one default w and A contains two axioms 3xQ(x) and +'(a). This theory contains an explicitly named individual a together with an implicitly defined individual that satisfies Q. Reiter suggests that the implicitly defined individual would satisfy P in the extension for (D, A). For this reason he introduced a new constant symbol c and replaced &Q(x) by Q(c). This immediately yields P(c) in the extension, which implies that 3x(Q(x) A P(x)) is also in the extension.
The next example deals with the case in which implicitly defined individuals are introduced by default. :
and A is empty. In this theory there is an implicitly defined individual which is introduced by the first default, and which satisfies P. One would expect, by the second default, that this individual would also satisfy Q, i.e., one would expect 3x(P(x) A Q(x)) to be in the extension. As in Example 6, Reiter introduces a new constant symbol c to denote this individual, and replaces the first default by w. This immediately yields P(c) in the extension and then, by the second default, Q(c) in the extension, and hence so is 3x(P(x) A Q(x)).
In view of these examples, when dealing with open default theories, Reiter explicitly describes the theory objects by giving names to individuals by the means of Sk&em functions. For this purpose, he replaces the set of axioms A by its Skolemization, and interprets an open default by the set of closed instances of its Skolemized form, see the definitions below.
The Skofemized form of a formula 4 is obtained as follows [16] . First put 4 in prenex normal form 4'. Then replace each existentially quantified variable x of 4' by f(x,-. . . ,x,,), where each xi, i = 1, . . . , n, is either a free variable of +', or is bound by the universal quantifier preceding 3x in the prefix of +', and f is a new function symbol distinct from any in the language L and distinct from any other such function symbols previously introduced. Do this for all existentially quantified variables of 4. The result of the above transformation is a formula 4' without existential quantifiers and with the same free variables. Deleting all of 4"s quantifiers results in a quantifier-free formula c#J', called the Skolemization of 4. The language L extended with the new function symbols will be denoted by L'.
For his definition of an extension for an open default theory Reiter also needs the notion of the Skofemized form of a default. The Skolemized form of a(x) = Z!rcX) Mfl~(Xy;r. Mflwt(x) , denoted (a(x))', is a default that results from 6(x) by replacing its conclusion y(x) by (-y(x))'. That is, Notice that the "top part" of a default remains unchanged in converting it to its Skolemized form.
Finally, for a set of formulas A we define the Skolemizution of A, denoted by Note that an extension is a set of sentences over the language L'. Therefore, when applied to a closed default theory, Definition 4 differs from Reiter's original definition (Definition 2). In [15] Reiter suggests to overcome this problem by allowing to admit into extensions for closed default theories sentences over the language L'.
The following examples indicate some shortcomings of Reiter's definition. In particular, when applied to close default theories, it is not equivalent to Definition 2. That is, Reiter's definition of extensions for open default theories does not pass the formal test.
Example 9. Let A , = {P(a)} and A z = {P(a), 3_&'(x)}. Since P(u) ~&9'(x), Th(A ,) = Th(A2). Therefore closed default theories (0, A,) and (0, A*) have the same unique extension Th({P(u)}). On the other hand, the Skolemization of (0, A ,) is a closed default theory (0, {P(u)}), and the Skolemization of (0, AZ) is a closed default theory (0, {P(u), 3xP(x), P(c)}), where c is a new constant (O-place function symbol) introduced in the process of Skolemization of 3xP(x). Since without Skolem axioms (see Definition 12 in the next section) there is no way to deduce P(c) from P(u), (0, A,) and (0, A *), when considered as open default theories having different extensions. has two extensions, one of which contains lP(a) and the other contains P(u).
An obvious reason for such a counterintuitive consequence of Reiter's definition is introducing the new free variable x by Skolemization of $$$ . In particular, in the definition of the Skolemized form of a default, it seems more natural to replace the conclusion y by 7'.
Example 11.' Consider a default theory (D, A), where D = {w} and A = 0. Intuitively, the default w expresses that P(x) is assumed to be false whenever possible,and we can expect that it will allow us to prove VxlP(x). But when passing to (D', AS), all that this default gives us is the sentences lP(t) for the closed terms t of L'.
In the next section we overcome the above illnesses of Reiter's definition by extending A with Skofern axioms, and restricting the extensions for open default theories to St,>, where St, denotes the set of all sentences over L.
A modification to Reiter's definition of open default theories
In this section we briefly discuss a version of Reiter's approach proposed in [6] . Example 11 suggests that in order to interpret an open default as the set of its closed instances, we need the domain closure assumption. In [6] the domain of the theory individuals is completely described by means of Skolem functions.
Definition 12.
Let f be a mapping from the set of all formulas over a language L of the form 3x+ to a list of new function symbols f&. We assume that f is one-to-one and if 3x1,!@, , . . . ,x,,, x) has exactly it free variables xi,. . . ,xn, then f 3x+ is an n-place (Skolem) function symbol. We call the language L* obtained Finally, for a first-order theory X over L, the Skolem expansion of X is a theory X* over L" defined by X* = X U SK. It is known that X* is a conservative expansion of' X. Reiter extension that contains 4. Thus, in particular, (D, A) has a modified Reiter extension that contains lVx(P(x) =x = a). Schwarz's proof is as follows.
By Definition 14, it suffices to show that (fi, A*) has an extension containing 4. Let $ denote P(x) A 14. Then A* U {UP} is consistent. Indeed, let w be a model of A U {3x3'(x), c$}. Then for some u in the domain of w, w k lP(u). Since w b 4, w k 13x+. Therefore w can be extended to a model w* of A * U { 3xlP(x), 4}, by defining an assignment to Skolem functions in such a way that f2,+ is assigned u, see [l, 
Bx(Q(x) A if'(x))?'
But why should Q(u) A P(a) imply (even by default)
An obvious reason for the excessive strength of the modified definition is giving explicit names for too many implicitly defined theory objects, and the unique name assumption for those objects. This problem can be avoided if we use Lifschitz's semantical approach that refers to the theory objects in an indirect way.
Semantical definition of extensions
This section contains a semantical definition of extensions for closed default theories introduced by Guerreiro and Casanova in [4] , which is the starting point for Lifschitz's and our approaches in Sections 7 and 8. For what follows we need a precise definition of semantics for the first-order predicate calculus.
An L-interpretation w consists of a non-empty domain U,,,, an assignment to each n-place predicate symbol P of L of an n-place relation P" in U,,,, and to each n-place function symbol f of L of an n-place function f w : U", + U,,,. (We treat the constants of L as O-place function symbols.)
For a term t(xl, . . . , x,J all of whose variables are among xi, . . . ,x,, we define a function, t"', from U", to U, by induction, as follows. Let ul, . . . , u, E U,. If t is a variable xi, then t"'(z+, . . . , un) = ui; and if t =f(tl, . . . , t,), where f is an m-place function symbol, then I Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) t"'(u,, . . . ,qr) =fw(ty(u,, >Un), ,t;;(u,, . . ,uJ) (Recall that we treat the constants of L as O-place function symbols.) We call t"'(u, . . ) u,,) the value of t(x,, ,x,,) at u,, . . . .u,.
Let 4(x,, . ,x,,) be a formula all of whose variables are among x1, . ,x,. We say that w satisfies C#I at u,, . . , u,!, denoted w k +(u,, . . , u,), if the following holds. If 4 is an atomic formula P(t,, , t,), then w k 4 if and only if (t;(u,,
. .u,,), . , fff'(u,,...,U,I))EP";w~$>cC,ifandonlyifw~+implies w~~;w~l~ifandonlyifw~~;andw~Vx~(x)ifandonlyforeachu~U,, w I= 4(u).
For an interpretation w we define the L-theory of w, denoted Th,(w), as the set of all sentences of L satisfied by w. That is, Th,(w) = {$ E St,: w k +}. Let X be a set of sentences over L. We say that w is a model of X, if XC Th,(w). Finally, for a class of interpretations W we define the L-theory of W, denoted Th,(W), as the set of all sentences of L satisfied by all the elements of W. That is, Th,(W) = n ,, Ew 'Q_(w).
We say that interpretations w, and wa are L-equivalent, if Th,(w,) = Th,(w,).
Note that the assignment to the equality relation in interpretations is a binary relation that does not have to be identity in the domain of the interpretation, but satisfies the equality first-order axioms. (Interpretations where the assignment to the equality relation is identity in the domain of the interpretation are called normal, see [12, p. 781 for details.) That is, equality relation is treated as an ordinary dyadic predicate which satisfies the equality axioms.
Extensions for a closed default theory can be defined semantically as follows. It is known from [4] that the definition of extensions as the theories of the fixed points of _Z is equivalent to Reiter's original definition (Definition 2). That is, a set of sentences E is an extension for a closed default theory (0, A) if and only if E =Th,(W) for some fixed point W of Z;D.Aj.
Lifschitz's approach to open default theories.
In this section we examine Lifschitz's definition of extensions for open default theories, called a default logic with a fixed universe [9, Section 31 . This definition involves a class of interpretations, called U-worlds, which are defined below. where L, denotes the language obtained from L by extending its set of constants with all elements of U. 9 We refer to the set W as the set of possible worlds, and we refer to the set V as the set of belief worlds. Note that the sentences of L, are of the form 4(u,, . . > u,), where ul,. . .,u,EU, and +(x1,.. . ,x,) is a formula of L all of whose free variables are among x1, . . . , x,.
A set of sentences E is called a U-extension for (D, A) if E = Th,(W) for some fixed point W of A&,Aj. Below U-extensions are referred to as Lifschitz extensions.
As it was pointed out in [9] , Definition 20 when applied to closed default theories is not equivalent to Definition 2, because the cardinality of U can be extracted from a U-extension in the following manner. For a positive integer n consider the sentence 3x,*--3x, A ( I<i<,<n X,fXj Avx( ,~nx=xi))
) denoted e,, , which states that there are exactly n distinct theory objects. For a domain U we defined card, = {e,}, if U is of a finite cardinality n, and card, = {~enL=l.2....9
if U is infinite. It immediately follows from Definitions 19 and 20 that any U-extension must contain card, as a subset, even for closed default theories (whose extensions do not depend on U). Thus Lifschitz's approach does not pass the formal test."'
As we shall see in the next section, the above deficiency of Lifschitz's approach can be eliminated, if we replace U-worlds by infinite non-normal interpretations with the same domain. That is, the equality symbol does not have to be interpreted by identity, but by an equivalence relation that satisfies the equality axioms, exactly as in the classical model theory. (For example e, has a model w with an infinite domain U,,,. In this model the number of the equivalence classes of CJ, modulo = w is n.) However, Lifschitz's definition has a deeper intrinsic problem, illustrated by the following example. and Th(A U {lP(b)}). However (D, A) has only one Lifschitz extension Th(A). Indeed, let U = {ur, u?}. It can be easily verified that Atb,,, has two fixed points V= {II,, u2} and W = {w 1, w2} which are defined by the following table. In this table, the meaning of the column marked u, is that the assignment to constants in u1 is defined by a"' = u 1 and b"' = u2, and the assignment to P in u, is defined by P"' = {ul}. The meaning of the other columns is similar.
Even though U, and v2 (w, and wz) belong to the same fixed point, their assignments to a and b are different. Therefore neither P(a), nor P(b) belongs to Th,(V) (Th,(W)). Thus Th,(V) = Th,(W) = Th(A).
Remark 22. In [9] Lifschitz claims that his formalization of default reasoning does not assume the domain closure assumption. However, for each fixed point W of Au the following holds. If 4(u) ~Th,~,(w) for every u E U, then V+(x) E ThL,(W) as well. In other words, the Carnap rule (which is equivalent to the domain closure assumption) is admissible for Th,"(W). In general, it is unclear how to deal with open defaults without the closure domain assumption, because we need a way to specify all objects of the theory, see [7] for a general discussion. Moreover, the domain closure assumption together with the fact that in a U-world 'I To some extent, such a replacement is analogous to the completion of a program in logic programming.
the assignment to the equality of L is identity (which corresponds to the unique name assumption, see Proposition 43 in the next section) is the reason for which we can extract the cardinality of U from a U-extension.
One of the reasons for counterintuitive consequences of Lifschitz's approach is that it does not distinguish between the assignments to explicitly and implicitly defined function symbols, In particular, in Example 21, the O-place function symbols (constants) a and b are treated as objects implicitly defined by their properties. The precise definition is as follows.
Definition 23. Let P be a mapping from the set of all function symbols f of a language L to a list of new predicate symbols Pr. We assume that P is one-to-one and, if f is an n-place function symbol, then Pr is an (n + 1)-place (defining) predicate symbol. We call the language L, obtained from L by deleting its function symbols and extending its predicate symbols with Pf's the defining expansion of L. The sentence Vx, -* -V.x,3!xPf(x1,. . . ,x,, x) is called a defining axiom. The set of all defining axioms is denoted by D.
For a formula 4 of L we define its translation, denoted dp, into L,, by induction, as follows. Consider a sequence &, +i, . . . of formulas over the language obtained by extending L with the new predicate symbols, such that & is 9, and 4i+1 results from & in the following manner. If +i does not contain function symbols, then the sequence terminates at +i. Otherwise, let f(tl, . . . , t,) be the leftmost term in 4i such that all ti are variables, and let P(. . . , f(tl, . . . , L), . . .) be the atomic subformula of 4i that contains that term. Then 4i+1 is obtained from +i by replacing P(. . . , f(tl, . . . , t,), . . .) with 3x(P&,, . . . , t,, x) A P(. . . ) x, . . .)). Since +i+1 contains one function symbol less than &, the above sequence must terminate. The last formula in the sequence is 4'. For a set of L-formulas X we define a set of L,-formulas Xp by Xp = (4': 4 E X}, and for a set D of defaults over L we define a set Dp of defaults over L, by Finally, for a first-order theory X over L, the defining expansion of X is a theory XD over L, defined by XD = Xp U D.
Proposition 24 below establishes a relationship between Lifschitz extensions for a default theory and its defining expansion, and sheds more light on the reason for the counterintuitive behavior of Lifschitz extensions demonstrated by Example 10.
Proposition 24. Let (D, A) be a default theory. Then E is a Lifschitz extension for (D, A) if and only if E ' is a Lifschitz extension for (D', AD).

Proof. Let w be an L-interpretation.
Consider an L,-interpretation wp such that
for any predicate symbol P of L, Pwp = P", and for any n-place function symbol f of L, the assignment to Pf is defined by P;'={(u I,..., u,,. f"'(U ,,..., u,,)): u I,..., U,,EU,.}.
It can be readily verified that wp k D, and that for any LEw sentence Hu1,. . .9un), +4&.. . , u,) if and only if wp k +"(ul,. . . , u,). Conversely, let w be an L,-interpretation such that w k D. Consider an L-interpretation wF such that U,, = U,, for any predicate symbol P of L, PWF = P", and for any n-place function symbol f of L and u,, In this section we modify Lifschitz's approach to make it free from the deficiencies discussed in the previous section. An obvious way to avoid the reference to the cardinality of the interpretation is to replace U-worlds by ordinary interpretations, and avoiding the function (constant) interpretation problem in Example 21, can be achieved by "separating" the assignments to functions and predicate symbols in an interpretation.
In particular, we should require the interpretations under consideration to have the same assignments to function symbols. Example 29 below formalizes these stronger requirements, but shows that they are still insufficient. First we need the following definition. In view of the above definition, an interpretation can be thought of as a pre-interpretation together with an assignment to the predicate symbols, or, alternatively, a pre-interpretation can be thought as a "function structure" of corresponding interpretations.'* The pre-interpretation of an interpretation w is denoted by F,, and we say that w is based on F,.
I* Pre-interpretations are widely used in logic programming to separate between the assignments to function and predicate symbols. see [IO] . Usually only one pre-interpretation is considered, the free, Herbrand one. Our modification of Lifschitz's approach is also based on free pre-interpretations, see Definition 34 below.
Definition 26. An L-interpretation based on a pre-interpretation F is called an F-world.
The opening paragraph of this section suggests to modify Definition 20 by adding the following compatibility requirement.
Definition 27. Let F be a pre-interpretation and let (D, A) be a default theory. For any set W of F-worlds let AF CD,AI(W) be the largest set, V, of F-worlds which are models of A that satisfies the following condition. Example 29. Consider a closed default theory ({w}, 0) which has a unique extension Th( {CX # b}). However it has two F-extensions: Th( {a = b}) and Th( {a Z b}). The former corresponds to the pre-interpretations with the same assignment to a and b, and the letter corresponds to the pre-interpretations, where the assignments to a and b are different.
Example 29 shows that the notion of compatibility introduced by Definitions 25-27 is not sufficient for the following reason. Fixing the assignments to function symbols might impose some undesirable constraints on the assignment to equality in the interpretation.
(In the example, uw =W b" is such a constraint on the assignment to equality in the interpretation w.) Therefore, if we want to proceed in that way, we must restrict ourselves to independent assignments to function symbols, i.e., to pre-interpretations which, roughly speaking, assign distinct elements of the domain to different terms. Definition 31. A pre-interpretation is called free if it is isomorphic to a Herbrand pre-interpretation.
The base b, of a free pre-interpretation F is the subset of its domain U, which consists of those elements u such that for no (n-place) function symbol f of L and for no u, , . , CL, E U,, u = f F(u,, . . . , un).
Free pre-interpretations play a major role in our modification to Lifschitz's approach; for a better intuition, some of their basic properties are stated below.
For any free pre-interpretation F the following holds. 
. , u,,).
For each term t(x, , . ,x,,) of L, whose set of free variables is {x,, . . . ,x,}, and for all u,, . . , u,~ E U,., f(u,, . ,un) # ui, i = 1,. . , II. Moreover, the following binary relation cF on U, is well-founded. The above properties of free pre-interpretations show that normal interpretations based on free pre-interpretations satisfy the equality theory, see [lo, p. 791 for the axioms of the equality theory.16 Conversely, it can be shown that if a pre-interpretation of a model of the equality theory is well-founded, then it is free.
Definition 32. A free pre-interpretation with an infinite base is called universal.17
The "universal" property of universal pre-interpretations is given by Proposition 33 below. f(t,, . . . , t,) Consider an interpretation wb such that F,,,, = Hb and for an n-place predicate symbol P, Pwb = {(u,, . . . ,u,): (E(u~), . . . , E(u,)) E P"}. We prove by induction on the length of an L-formula 4(x,, . . . ,x,) that wb k 4(u,, . . . , un) if and only if NJ t= 4 (&(%), . . ., E(u,) ). By the definition of wb this is true for atomic formulas, and the case of propositional connectives 3 and 1 is immediate. For the case of the existential quantifier, if wb k 3x4(x, ul,. . . , u,), then for some u E Uwb, (In other words we allow the assignments to equality to vary over the pre-interpretation domain.) In particular, whereas Lifschitz's original definition, requiring the normal interpretation of the equality relation, emphasizes the predicate structure of the interpretation, our approach is based on the compatibility of the function assignments.
Examples 38-41 below (which are continuations of Examples 5, 16, 17, and 21 respectively) show the behavior of the modified definition in some cases where both Reiter's and Lifschitz's approaches are counterintuitive.
The proofs in this section are based on the following definition and lemmas. In particular, Lemma 37 is similar to Lemma 3 and is a relativization of [9, Proposition 61 to the F-worlds.
Definition 35. Let p(x) be an L-formula. For an interpretation w, p"' denotes the set of tuples u such that w k P(U). Let D be a set of normal defaults without prerequisites and let F be a pre-interpretation.
We say that an F-world w is D-maximal if there is no F-world w' such that for all w E D, p"' C p '"'; and for some w E D, p"' is a proper subset of p"'. Finally, we say that F-worlds w1 and w2 are D-equivalent, denoted w1 -D w2, if /?"'I = /3"', for all w E D. (It immediately follows from the definition that yD is an equivalence relation.)
Lemma 36. Let (D, A) be a default theory and let D contain a normal default without prerequisites w.
Let F be an L-pre-interpretation and let W be a set of
F-worlds. If for some w E W and some tuple u of elements of U,, w + /3(u), then for any u E Af,,,,(W), TV k P(u).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the definition of Af;D,aj (Definition 27). 0
The following lemma is similar to [9, Proposition 61 which shows that the fixed points of A:;+J)
,,,) correspond to the extends of /3 in {/3}-maximal U-worlds. Ob vrously, if an F-world w satisfying ZlxQ(x) is P-maximal, then w k VxP(x). Therefore (D, A) has a unique modified Lifschitz extension {VxP(x), 3xQ(x)}. In particular, this extension contains 3x(P(x) A Q(x)), which is what we expect in our case of an implicitly defined individuals, see the discussion in Example 5. D, A) has a unique modified Lifschitz extension Th({Vx(P(x) =x = a)}). We see that, like in Example 15, the meaning of default w is that P(X) is assumed to be false whenever possible. 
By Lemma 37, (D, A) has two modified Lifschitz extensions Th(A U {lP(u)})
and Th(A U {+'(b)}), which are exactly what we expect in our case of an explicitly defined finite domain, see the discussion in Example 21.
The next theorem shows that modified Lifschitz extensions pass the formal test. That is, for closed default theories they coincide with the ordinary extensions.
Theorem 42. Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. Then a set of sentences is an extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a modified Lifschitz extension for (D, A).
Proof. Let E be an extension for (D, A) and let F be a universal L*-preinterpretation.
By Proposition 33, for each model w of E there is an L-equivalent interpretation wF based on F. Let W= {wF: w k E}. By the definition of wF, W is a set of F-worlds such that E = Th,(W).
Thus in order to prove that E is an F-extension for (D, A), it suffices to show that W is the largest set of belief F-worlds that satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for the default theory (D, A) and the set of possible worlds W. which allows to describe Lifschitz extension in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions without explicit reference to the cardinality of the domain.
Proposition 43. Assume that L contains no function symbols. Then a set of sentences is a Lifschitz extension for (D, A) if and only if for some U, it is a modified Lifschitz extension for
Proposition 44. Assume that L contains no function symbols. Then a set of sentences is a Lifschitz extension for (D. A) if and only if it is a modified Lifschitz extension for
:Mx,fx2 :Mx,=x2
x, #x, ' x, =x2
Propositions 43 and 44 are immediate corollaries, respectively, of Theorems 53 and 54 which we prove in the next section. The theorems generalize the propositions to default logics with fixed constants.
The following corollaries to Propositions 43 and 44 show how Lifschitz extensions can be translated into modified ones. 
Default logic with fixed constants
In this section we express extensions for default logics with fixed constants introduced in [9, Section 61 in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions, see Theorems 53 and 54 below. These theorems show that a predicate P can be fixed by two "opposite" defaults : ?I$?) and w.
That is, fixing constants can be moved down from the "meta-level" to the "object level", which allows US to avoid Lifschitz's explicit reference to fixed constants.
We believe that the results in this section are of interest because, apart from showing the expressive power of modified Lifschitz extensions, they allow to establish a relationship between (modified) Lifschitz extensions and the original McCarthy's circumscription, where all the predicate symbols (but the circumscribed one) and all the function symbols are fixed."
To proceed we need the following generalizations of Definitions 25-27.
Definition 47. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. A C-structure s consists of a non-empty domain US, an assignment to each n-place predicate symbol P of C of an n-place relation P" in US, and to each n-place function symbol f of C of an n-place function fS : 17: + Us." If C contains = and =S is identity, then s is called normal.
Definition 48. Let s be a C-structure. We say that an L-interpretation w is an s-world, if U, = U,; for each predicate symbol P of C, P" = P"; and for each function symbol f of C, f w = f". If s is a normal C-structure, then s-worlds are also called normal. Substituting -tP(x) for p(x) in Lemma 36, P E C U { =}, we obtain that the assignment to P is the same relation Pw on U, in all the elements of W. (Recall that all the elements of W have the same domain U,.) In particular, =w ' is a congruence relation. Since card, E Th,(W), the cardinality of the set of equivalence classes of =w .
1s equal to the cardinality of U, if U is finite, and is infinite otherwise. Therefore we may replace U by the set of equivalence classes of =w, which we shall also denote by U. We denote the equivalence class of u E U, by E(U).
For an F-world w E W, let E(W) denote the interpretation over the domain U such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of L, P"""' = {(I, . . . , E(u,)): (u,,. .* t un) E P"}. Since the elements of the same equivalence class are indistinguishable in w, E(W) is well defined (and is L-equivalent to w). It follows that the restriction of any E(W) to the assignments to the elements of C results in the same C-structure s. Moreover, since, by definition, =' is identity, s is normal.
Let E(W) = {E(W): w E W}. We contend that E(W) is a fixed point of A&,Aj such that Th,(s(W)) = l%,(W).
Let w E W. It follows from the definition of c(w) that for any formula 4(x,, . . . ,xn) of L and any ui, . . . However, this contradicts the maximality of W. Conversely, let s be a normal C-structure, and let W be a fixed point of A;D,AJ.
We distinguish between the case of finite and infinite U,. First assume that U, is infinite. Let F be a universal pre-interpretation with the base U,. (Since L has no function symbols, F = U, = U, .) Then the belief set W considered as a set of F-worlds satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for
, A U card,
PEC
and the set of possible F-worlds W. (Recall the elements of Ware s-worlds.) Thus the proof in the case of infinite U will be completed if we show that W is the largest set of the belief F-worlds satisfying that condition.
Assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief F-worlds Vsuch that W is a proper subset of V, and V satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for
and the set of possible F-worlds W. Let P E C U { =}. Substituting 1P for p in Lemma 36, we obtain that V is a set of s-worlds, which contradicts the maximality of w. Now assume that U, is finite. Let F be a universal pre-interpretation and let E be a mapping from U,; onto U,. For an s-world w E W, let E-'(W) denote the interpre;a;ion,over the domain U, such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of L, P' " -,(u, , . , u,,):
(.$u,), .
. , E(u,,)) E P"}. P(u,, . . . ,u,) . Indeed, since W is a set of s-worlds, either E-' (W) k P(u,, . . . , un) Let P E C U { =}. Substituting lP(x) for p(x) in Lemma 36 we obtain that the assignment to P is the same relation Pw on U, in all the elements of W. (Recall that all the elements of W have the same domain U,.) In particular, = w is a congruence relation. We denote the equivalence class of u E U, modulo =w by F(U), and we denote the set of equivalence classes of =w by .$U,). That is, &(UF) = {G)>,EU,.. For an F-world w E W, let E(W) denote the interpretation over the domain
such that for an n-place predicate
(u,, . . .7 un) E P"} , and for an n-place function symbol f of L and for u ,,..., u,EU,, "'(z.+, . . . ,u,) ).
Since the elements of the same equivalence class of =w are indistinguishable in w, E(W) is well defined (and is L-equivalent to w). It follows that the restriction of any E(W) to the assignments to the elements of C U { =} results in the same C-structure S. Moreover, since, by definition, = ' is identity, s is normal. Now exactly as in the proof of Theorem 53 it can be shown that E(W) = {E(W): w E W} is a fixed point Conversely, Ict s be a normal C-structure, and let W be a fixed point of A&,). Let F be a universal pre-interpretation such that the cardinality of b, is not less than the cardinality of U,. Let E be a mapping from b, onto U,. We extend E onto U,, by induction as follows. For an n-place function symbol f of L and u,,..., u,, E II,., E(~~(u,.
. , u,!)) =~$(E(u,), . , I).
(Here we use the condition that C contains all the function symbols of L.) For an s-world w E W, let E-'(W) denote the interpretation based >z,F such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of L and u ,,..., u,,EU~, In particular, E-'(W) b A. Let P E C u { = } . Since s is a (normal) C-structure, the assignment to P is the same in all the elements of 6 '(W). Therefore Th,(&-l(W)) = Th,(W), and that the set of the belief F-worlds F-'(W) satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for and the set of possible F-worlds e-'(W).
Let u E V, P E C U {=}, and let Ml,..., U, E U,. We contend that u b P(u,, . . . , u,,) if and only if e-'(W) k P(u,, *. . ,u,). As we have seen earlier, e-'(W) k P(u,, . . . ,u,) if and only if w I= P(&(%), . * . , E(u,)), and, since all the elements of W are (normal) s-worlds, either W k P(e(ul), . . . , E(u,)) or W b ~P(E(u~), . . . , E(u,)). Therefore the "if" direction of the contention follows from Lemma 36 with p being P, and the only if direction follows from Lemma 36 with /3 being -IP. Thus, E(U) is an s-structure.
It follows that E(V) is the set of s-worlds which contains W as a proper subset. Also the set of the belief s-worlds e(V) satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) and the set of possible s-worlds W, which contradicts the maximality of w. cl Next we describe normal C-extensions in terms of Lifschitz extensions. The proof of Proposition 58 differs from that of Proposition 57 only in replacing the words "Theorem 53" by "Theorem 54". We leave it to the reader.
Proposition 60 below shows that normal C-extensions can be expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions in a more direct manner. Namely, instead of passing to the defining expansion of L and fixing the defining predicates of the functions belonging to C, it suffices to "define" the varied function symbols, only. We shall need the following generalization of Definition 23.
Definition 59. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. Let P be a mapping from the set of all function symbols f of L which do not belong to C to a list of new predicate symbols Pf. We assume that P is one-to-one and if f is an n-place function symbol, then Pr is an n + l-place (defining) predicate symbol. We call the language LDc, obtained from L by deleting its function symbols not belonging to C and extending its predicate symbols with {Pf: fjZC} the (C-) defining expansion of L. 22 For f$ C, the sentence Vx, . . . Vx,3 !xPf(x, , . . . , x,, x) is called a (C-) defining axiom. The set of all C-defining axioms is denoted by D,.
For a formula 4 of L we define its translation, denoted $", into LD,, by induction, as follows. Consider a sequence &, 4,) . . . of formulas over the language extended with the new predicate symbols, such that +,, is (6, and $i+ l results from 4, in the following manner. If 4; does not contain function symbols not belonging to C, then the sequence terminates at 4i. Otherwise, let f(t,,. . . , t,) be the leftmost term in +i such that f$ C and all t, are variables; and let P(. , f(t,, . , t,l), . . .) be the atomic subformula of 4, that contains that term. Then +,+, is obtained from $i by replacing P(. . . , f(t,, . . . , t,) , . . .) with 3x(P& ) . , t,, , x) A P(. . , x, .)). Since the number of function symbols of &+ , which do not belong to C is one less than the number of those in $i, the above sequence must terminate. The last formula in the sequence is 4". For a set of L-formulas X we define a set of L,(,-formulas Xp' by Xp' = {4',-: 4 E X} and for a set D of defaults over L we define a set Dp' of defaults over LDc. by 
Modified Lifschitz extensions and circumscription
It is known from [9] that circumscription can be expressed in terms of normal extensions with fixed constants. Since, by Propositions 57, 58, and 60, normal extensions with fixed constants can be expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions, circumscription can be expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions as well. For the proofs of the expressibility results in this section we need to extend Definition 35 and Lemma 37 to arbitrary C-structures.
Definition 61. Let D be a set of normal defaults without prerequisites. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols and let s be a C-structure. We say that an s-world w is D-maximal if there is no s-world w' such that for all w E D, P" c P"'; and for some e E D, /3 w is a proper subset of p w'. We say that s-worlds w1 and w2 are P-equivalent, denoted w1 -D w2, if /3 w1 = /3 w2, for all w E D. (It immediately follows from the definition that -D is an equivalence relation.)
The proof of the following lemma is similar to that of Lemma 37 and will be omitted. where s is a C-structure, and the result follows from Proposition 57. 0
The proof of Propositions 64 and 65 differs from that of Proposition 63 only in replacing the words "Proposition 57" by "Proposition 58" and "Proposition 60", respectively. We leave them to the reader. Now the original McCarthy's circumscription of one predicate can be very nicely expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions. Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 65, because if C contains all the function and predicate symbols, but P, then ADC is A itself. 0
In the above propositions, dealing with normal interpretations, we implicitly used the assumption that = does not belong to P. Indeed, by definition, = is fixed in normal interpretations (which are #-maximal). One of the features of our approach is that it allows = to vary. Thus, we can try to circumscribe equality, by substituting = for P in Proposition 66. Note that for this we have first to pass to the defining expansion, because we cannot use equality anymore for fixing function symbols. Equivalently, instead of passing to the defining expansion of L, we may assume that L does not have function symbols.
Let EQ(=) be the set of all the equality axioms. The "syntactical" circumscription of = in EQ(=) states that = is the minimal congruence relation, which also follows from the definition of equality without applying circumscription.23 If in Proposition 66 we substitute = for P, we obtain that u sentence 4 ti entailed by the circumscription of = if and only if 4 belongs to all modified Lifschitz extensions for or, equivalently, that 4 is satisfied by all normal interpretations. That is, semantically, the circumscribed equality is identity, which perfectly matches the intuition. Since the syntactical counterpart of satisfiability by all the normal interpretations is provability in the first-order predicate calculus, as we already know, the result of circumscription of = in EQ(=) is = itself.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we pointed out some obvious lacks of definitions of extensions for open default theories known from the literature, and considered a possible definition which is less vulnerable. This definition, basically, follows Lifschitz's semantical approach [9] , whereas other definitions of extensions for open default theories known from the literature are syntactical. In particular, whereas in Reiter's and Poole's approaches the free variables of a default are treated as meta-variables for closed terms, in Lifschitz's and our approaches they are treated as the theory object variables. The reason for choosing semantical definition of extensions is that it provides a complete (but indirect) description of the theory objects, which in turn, implies the domain closure assumption.
The difference between ours and Lifschitz's original definition is the replacement of sets of normal interpretations over the same possibly finite domain by sets of interpretations with the same universal pre-interpretation.
Whereas normal and universal non-normal interpretation approaches are equivalent in the case of closed default theories considered by Guerreiro and Casanova in [4] , the restriction to normal interpretations implies undesirable consequences in the case of open default theories. In general, the restriction to normal interpretations seems unnatural, because, for example, equality is definable, if the underlying language has only finitely many predicate and function symbols.
The second difference between Lifschitz's and our approaches is that Lifschitz's definition, requiring the assignment of identity to the equality relation, empha-sizes the predicate structure of the interpretation, whereas our approach is based on the compatibility of the assignments to function symbols. An indirect support for the compatibility requirement is that the assignment to functions in the worlds of Kripke models for the first-order modal logics must be compatible (and can be assumed universal), and there is a tight relationship between closed default theories and nonmonotonic modal logics, see [6] .
Finally we would like to note that the evidence for the rightness of our approach is only intuitive. There is no (and cannot be any) conclusive formal criteria for the rightness of a definition of extensions for open default theories. The question "which definition is the right one?" can be answered only by a field test.
